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IN RE AKHBAR BEIRUT & AL AMIN. STL-14-06/S/CJ. At https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/
contempt-cases/stl-14-06.
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, August 29, 2016.
On August 29, 2016, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (Tribunal) sentenced a corporate
media enterprise and one of its employees for contemptuously interfering with the Tribunal’s
proceedings in Ayyash, a prosecution concerning the February 2005 terrorist attack that killed
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.1 The contempt decision is significant for two
reasons: (1) it adopts an expansive definition of the crime of contempt to restrict a journalist’s
freedom of expression; and (2) it is the first international judicial decision to hold a corporate
entity criminally responsible.
1 See In re Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin, Case No. STL-14-06/S/CJ, Reasons for Sentencing Judgment (Spec.
Trib. Leb. Sept. 5, 2016), at https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-06/filings-stl-14-06/
other-filings-stl-14-06/5190-f0265. Documents concerning Ayyash are available at https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/
the-cases/stl-11-01.
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Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin arose out of two January 2013 articles that appeared in the Al
Akhbar newspaper and on its Arabic and English language websites. The articles were avail-
able online until February 2016. They listed the names, photographs, and other personal
identifying information of thirty-two people who were alleged to be witnesses before the
Tribunal. In addition, they provided summary accounts of a few purported witness state-
ments before the Tribunal. One article claimed that “close observers of the ‘Hariri
Tribunal’ can confirm that most of its files, if not all of them, are disclosed to those who
wish to obtain them.”2 Both articles were attributed to Ibrahim Al Amin, the editor in
chief and chairman of the board of directors of Al Akhbar.
Al Akhbar’s corporate entity, Akhbar Beirut, andMr. Al Aminwere charged with contempt
under Rule 60bis(A) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. That rule provides
that “[t]he Tribunal, in the exercise of its inherent power, may hold in contempt those who
knowingly and wilfully interfere with its administration of justice . . . .”3 The rule then con-
tains a nonexhaustive list of conduct that qualifies as contemptuous interference. The list
includes intimidating or interfering with a Tribunal witness. But the charge in this case
was not that the published articles obstructed or interfered with actual Tribunal witnesses;
it was that publishing information about purported witnesses interfered with the administra-
tion of justice by undermining public confidence in the Tribunal’s ability to protect the con-
fidentiality of information relating to Tribunal witnesses.
Comparable charges were simultaneously filed against a different media organization, New
TV, and one of its employees, Karma Al Khayat. The New TV and the Akhbar Beirut defen-
dants all appeared before the same contempt judge, Judge Nicola Lettieri. However, theNew
TV defendants were ultimately acquitted.4
Judge Lettieri issued a redacted version of his judgment inAkhbar Beirut & Al Amin on July
15, 2016. The judgment asserted that the actus reus in this case would be satisfied if: (1) the
accused published information on purported confidential witnesses; and (2) such publication
created a likelihood of undermining public confidence in the Tribunal’s ability to protect the
confidentiality of information relating to Tribunal witnesses. Judge Lettieri underscored that,
for the second element, he did not have to find that theAl Akhbar publications actually eroded
public confidence in the Tribunal; it would suffice if the publications created the likelihood
of that effect. Themens rea for the offense is, under the plain text of Rule 60bis(A), knowledge
and willfulness (Judgment, paras. 37–43).
After reviewing the evidence, including the testimonies of five people the articles identified
as witnesses, Judge Lettieri found that Mr. Al Amin had committed the offense of contempt
—specifically, that his articles “created an objective likelihood that public confidence in the
Tribunal would be undermined and that moreover, such a likelihood was intended by the
Articles’ authors” (Judgment, para. 111). To support that finding, Judge Lettieri noted
2 In re Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin, Case No. STL-14-06/T/CJ, Public Redacted Version of the Judgment, para.
111 (Spec. Trib. Leb. July 15, 2016), at https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-06/judg-
ments-stl-14-06/5092-f0262prv (quoting Al Akhbar article) [hereinafter Judgment].
3 STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 60bis(A), STL-BD-2009-01-Rev.8 (as amended and corrected on
April 3, 2017), at https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/rules-of-procedure-and-evidence.
4 See In re Al Jadeed/New TV&Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05/A/AP, Public Redacted Version of Judgment
on Appeal (Spec. Trib. Leb. Mar. 8, 2016), at https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05/fil-
ings-stl-14-05/appeal-1/judgments-stl-14-05/4823-f0028.
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that the articles divulged details about alleged witnesses “in a politically charged environment
with sectarian tensions and significant, powerful opposition to the Tribunal . . . ” and that
“individuals publicly denounced as opponents of the Resistance were placed at an elevated
risk of harm” (id.). In this environment,
[t]he allegation that anyone desiring confidential information from the Tribunal can
obtain it, in conjunction with the publication of photographs and personal information
allegedly associated with such confidential information, strongly contribute[d] to the
negative impact on public confidence in the Tribunal’s ability to protect confidentiality.
(Id.)5
After determining that Mr. Al Almin committed the offense of contempt, Judge Lettieri
assessed whether Mr. Al Almin’s conduct could nevertheless be excused by his freedom of
expression. Judge Lettieri stated that, under international and Lebanese law, an individual’s
freedom of expressionmust be balanced against other societal interests, including “the need to
protect the integrity of judicial proceedings and to ensure the safety of justice system partic-
ipations” (Judgment, para. 158). Judge Lettieri asserted that, while journalists may report on
and criticize the Tribunal’s work, there is a “clear distinction” between that kind of journalism
and “publishing the names, photographs and other identifying information of 32 purported
confidential witnesses.”He found that the latter “serves no journalistic value or pressing social
need” and is not “consistent with journalistic standards or ethics” (Judgment, paras. 161,
163). For example, Mr. Al Amin had not demonstrated that he had tried to substantiate
his allegations from reliable sources or that he had adopted the perspective of a “neutral
observer,” as opposed to a “political advocate” (Judgment, para. 111).6 Judge Lettieri con-
cluded that “the prohibition on publishing this kind of information, that is objectively likely
to undermine public confidence in the Tribunal, constitutes a proper limit on the freedom of
the press as it protects a conflicting but worthy social need: the integrity and proper function-
ing of judicial proceedings by ensuring the safety of witnesses called to collaborate with the
justice system” (Judgment, para. 163).
Having found Mr. Al Amin guilty as charged, Judge Lettieri turned to assessing the con-
duct ofMr. Al Amin’s corporate employer, Akhbar Beirut. The case had already gone through
several twists and turns on the issue of corporate liability. Judge Lettieri had earlier decided, in
the sister case of New TV & Al Khayat, that the Tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction to hold
contempt proceedings against legal persons.7 In particular, he decided that the word “person”
in Rule 60bis refers only to natural persons and does not authorize the Tribunal to conduct
contempt proceedings against legal persons. Here, Judge Lettieri relied on the interpretive
canon of ubi lex voluit dixit, ubit noluit tacuit: one who wants something says it; one who
does not want anything is silent. He reasoned that, because the Tribunal’s Statute
5 See also Judgment, para. 120 (finding that the articles “received widespread and negative attention in Lebanon
by the public in general [and] . . . that the lives of Tribunal witnesses had been put at risk by the disclosures”).
6 See also Judgment, para. 146 (“[T]he content and tone of the 15 and 19 January Articles fail to demonstrate
objective reporting of a journalistic investigation, but rather, manifest the views of a political advocate who paints
purported STL witnesses in a negative light and portray them as counter to Hezbollah. . . .”).
7 In re New TV S.A.L. & Al Khayat, Case No. STL-14-05/I/CJ, Decision onMotion Challenging Jurisdiction
and on Request for Leave to Amend Order in Lieu of an Indictment (Spec. Trib. Leb. July 24, 2014), at https://
www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05/filings-stl-14-05/main-case/orders-and-decisions-stl-14-
05/3375-f0054.
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and Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not specifically provide for the Tribunal to exercise
jurisdiction over legal persons, Rule 60bis unambiguously applies only to natural
persons.8 Judge Lettieri noted that “many important legal systems” have not yet accepted
the concept of corporate criminality, that “[n]o international criminal court or tribunal has
ever been granted explicit authority to or found that it had authority to try legal persons,” and
that “there is no general principle of international criminal law, international treaty or cus-
tomary law supporting corporate liability. . . .”9 Finally, Judge Lettieri explained that if Rule
60bis is ambiguous on whether it applies to legal persons, it ought to be interpreted in the light
most favorable to the accused and limited to natural persons.10
However, in October 2014, an Appeals Panel (Panel) overturned Judge Lettieri’s decision
on jurisdiction in New TV, deciding that Rule 60bis covers both natural and legal persons.11
The Panel found, contrary to Judge Lettieri, that the rule is not silent; it is instead ambiguous
on this point. In interpreting the rule, the Panel used the methods of interpretation that are
provided for in Rule 3(A) of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence:
The Rules shall be interpreted in amanner consonant with the spirit of the Statute and, in
order of precedence, (i) the principles of interpretation laid down in customary interna-
tional law as codified in Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (1969), (ii) international standards on human rights, (iii) the general principles
of international criminal law and procedure, and, as appropriate, (iv) the Lebanese Code
of Criminal Procedure.12
With respect to Rule 3(A)(ii) and (iii), the Appeals Panel found substantial evidence that
corporate responsibility is now recognized inmost domestic legal systems and, increasingly, in
international human rights law. The Panel admitted that states differ on the question of
whether corporations can be held responsible in criminal, or only in civil, actions. But the
Panel ultimately found that many states recognize corporate criminal liability. The Panel
thus concluded that “corporate criminal liability is on the verge of attaining, at the very
least, the status of a general principle of law applicable under international law.”13 In light
of that evidence, it decided that the “singular fact” that “no post-World War II international
criminal court or tribunal has previously found that it had the authority to try legal persons. . .”
was an insufficient reason to interpret Rule 60bis to exclude legal persons.14
Next, the Appeals Panel turned to Lebanese law. Although Rule 3(A)(iv) points interpret-
ers to the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure, the Panel decided that, in a case like this one,
it could also look to the Lebanese Criminal Code. The Panel explained that
8 Id., para. 71.
9 Id., paras. 74–75.
10 Id., para. 76.
11 In re New TV S.A.L. & Al Kayaht, Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings (Spec. Trib. Leb. Oct. 2, 2014), at https://
www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-05/filings-stl-14-05/main-case/orders-and-decisions-stl-14-
05/3515-f0012-ar126-1 [hereinafter New TV Appellate Decision on Jurisdiction].
12 See also id., para. 26.
13 Id., para. 67.
14 Id.
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where a rule is declarative of the Tribunal’s inherent power over the crime of contempt, it
is relevant to draw upon the Lebanese Criminal Code which lists substantive criminal
offences as opposed to the Lebanese Code of Criminal Procedure which, by nature,
merely addresses procedural aspects.15
The Panel found that “it is foreseeable under Lebanese law that the owner of a journalistic
publication or a television station could be either a natural or a legal person and could be
criminally liable. . . .”16
The very next month—in November 2014—Judge Lettieri issued his decision on jurisdic-
tion in Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin, and he declined to follow the reasoning of the Appeals Panel
in New TV.17 He again held that the Tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over corporate
entities, like Akhbar Beirut, in contempt proceedings. He insisted that, in the absence of
any specific provision defining “person” to include legal persons, the word must be inter-
preted to refer only to natural persons. Here, he emphasized that
laws on a domestic level related to corporate liability not only expressly provide for the crim-
inal liability of the corporations (which—again—our Rules do not), but also establish com-
plex regimes for the imputation of criminal responsibility to these legal persons and for their
participation in the criminal proceedings. (Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 49)
Further, he claimed that, if Rule 60bis is ambiguous, then interpreting it to cover legal persons
would run afoul of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. “This is because ambiguity in the
wording of a law and vagueness of legal notions could make the crime in question unforesee-
able . . . [which] would prevent potential accused from knowing in advance if their conduct
constitutes an offence” (Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 39).
Judge Lettieri claimed that he was not bound to follow the reasoning of theNew TV Panel
because the Appeals Chamber had not established a rule of stare decisis for the Tribunal.
Further, he argued that the interest of consistency in judicial decisionmaking weighed against
following New TV. He reasoned that, because New TV “is an isolated decision that finds no
precedent in international law . . . [c]onsistency—both with respect to this Tribunal and
international criminal law as a whole—is better served by a decision rejecting the
Tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction over legal entities” (Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 71).
This way, Judge Lettieri explained, another Appeals Panel would have the opportunity to
consider the issue of corporate criminal responsibility.
As it turned out, the Appeals Panel that reviewed Judge Lettieri’s decision on jurisdiction in
Akhbar Beirut was composed of two of the appellate panelists from the New TV decision.18
The Panel again reversed him, explaining that it did not see any reason to depart from the
reasoning in New TV. The Panel emphasized three points. First, Rule 60bis is ambiguous
15 Id., para. 68.
16 Id., para. 71.
17 In re Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin, Case No. STL-14-06/PT/CJ, Decision onMotion Challenging Jurisdiction
(Spec. Trib. Leb. Nov. 6, 2014), at https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-06/filings-stl-14-
06/orders-and-decisions-stl-14-06/3593-f0069 [hereinafter Akhbar Beirut Decision on Jurisdiction].
18 In re Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin, Case No. STL-14-06/PT/AP/AR126.1, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings (Spec. Trib. Leb. Jan. 23, 2015), at https://www.stl-
tsl.org/en/the-cases/contempt-cases/stl-14-06/filings-stl-14-06/orders-and-decisions-stl-14-06/3742-f0004-
ar126-1.
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on the question of whether it applies to legal persons. Second, interpreting the rule to apply to
legal persons does not contravene the principle of legality because it does not create a new
offense or element of an offense; it only addresses the status of perpetrators over whom the
Tribunal has jurisdiction. Third, this Tribunal is unlike other international criminal tribunals
in that it is substantially guided by Lebanese law, which permits the criminal responsibility of
legal persons for contempt.19
Thus, by the time Judge Lettieri issued his judgment in Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin, the juris-
dictional question on legal persons had already been extensively litigated and resolved. Judge
Lettieri relied on Lebanese law to identify the attribution requirements for holding legal per-
sons responsible for contempt. He explained that, under Lebanese law, a judge may hold a
corporation responsible upon finding that a specific natural person: (1) is criminally respon-
sible; (2) was in a position to act on the corporate accused’s behalf; and (3) committed the
criminal conduct on behalf of or using the means of the corporate accused (Judgment, paras.
44–45). Judge Lettieri found that those elements of corporate criminality were satisfied here
and thus that Akhbar Beirut had contemptuously interfered with the Tribunal’s administra-
tion of justice (Judgment, paras. 164–71).
At the sentencing stage, Judge Lettieri imposed a fine of 20,000 euros onMr. Al Amin and a
fine of 6,000 euros on Akhbar Beirut. The sentencing decision is unremarkable, except that it
seems to go out of its way to impose a low fine on Akhbar Beirut, despite the earlier finding that
the contemptuous behavior in this case was particularly egregious. Judge Lettieri explained that,
[g]iven the novelty of sentencing a legal person for contempt of an international tribunal,
the foreseeability of the range of fines as set out in the Lebanese Law of Publications, as
well as the separate penalty already imposed onMr Al Amin as an individual, I find that a
fine of 6,000 Euros—a quantum roughly equivalent to the minimum fine contemplated
for a similarly positioned Accused in Lebanese law—is appropriate. . . . (Reasons for
Sentencing Judgment, para. 24)
* * * *
Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin is perhaps most significant for its determination on corporate
criminal responsibility. It is the first international judicial decision to hold a corporate entity
criminally responsible under international law. As such, it provides an opening for other inter-
national or national courts to find that corporate criminality is cognizable in, or at least not
foreclosed by, international law. The question is whether other courts will exploit that open-
ing and rely on Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin as persuasive authority.
Some of the Tribunal’s reasoning on corporate criminality clearly extends beyond this spe-
cific institution. Recall, for example, that the New TV Panel reviewed the domestic and
human rights practice on corporate responsibility and then asserted that “corporate criminal
liability is on the verge of attaining, at the very least, the status of a general principle of law
applicable under international law.”20 That assertion is bold and likely to be invoked by pro-
ponents of corporate criminality in future cases.
But embedded within the case are three grounds for limiting its precedential impact. First,
the decision on corporate criminality ultimately rests on an interpretation of Tribunal’s own
19 Id., paras. 72–74 (summary).
20 New TV Appellate Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 11, para. 67.
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texts—the ambiguity in Rule 60bis and, as theAkhbar Beirut Panel underscored, the license in
Rule 3(A) to look for interpretive guidance in Lebanese law. Other international courts will
have to interpret their texts when determining whether to exercise jurisdiction over legal per-
sons; they might reasonably find that, even if this Tribunal has such jurisdiction, they do not.
For example, the drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
considered, but decided not to provide for, jurisdiction over legal persons. If the ICC were
to rely on Akhbar Beirut for persuasive authority, it presumably would have to grapple with
that negotiating history. Similarly, most national courts are likely to be guided or restricted by
their own domestic laws. They might find reasons in domestic law to limit their jurisdiction
over corporate entities in cases involving international crimes.
Second, even this Tribunal seems to have jurisdiction over legal persons only in ancillary
cases of contempt, not in cases concerning the principal offenses for which the Tribunal was
established. The judge who initiated Akhbar Beirut andNew TV, Judge Lettieri, and theNew
TV Appeals Panel all hinted that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction over legal persons for
the principal offenses. The reason for this limitation, to the extent that it exists, relates again to
specific language in the Tribunal’s foundational texts. Still, the repeated suggestion that the
Tribunal lacks jurisdiction over legal persons for the principal offenses suggests a desire to
limit the effect of these contempt proceedings. Finally, the Tribunal’s reasoning on corporate
criminality might be limited because future decisionmakers might reject or refute it on its
own terms. Judge Lettieri’s decisions provide plenty of material with which to undercut
that reasoning and, in Judge Lettieri words, treat the case as “an isolated decision.”21
Apart from its ruling on corporate criminality, Akhbar Beirut & Al Amin is an important
decision on the offense of contemptuous interference. The judgment adopts a broad defini-
tion of contempt to proscribe not only conduct that actually and directly obstructs Tribunal
proceedings, but also conduct that presents a likelihood of indirectly obstructing the proceed-
ings by undermining public confidence in the institution. This broad definition was necessary
to capture the conduct at issue here because the defendants were not charged with releasing
information on, intimidating, or harming people who had actually appeared before the
Tribunal. The charge was that they interfered with the administration of justice by releasing
information on people who were alleged to be confidential witnesses.
That charge might reflect the Tribunal’s own reluctance to acknowledge that witness infor-
mation had been leaked. But perhaps because the harm was amorphously defined, so too was
the justification for finding the defendants in contempt. In particular, it is not clear to what
extent the decision turns on the content of the Al Akhbar articles—the names, photos, and
identifying information of alleged witnesses—or why that content matters. If the named peo-
ple had actually been confidential witnesses, then it would be routine to treat as contemptu-
ous the publication of their identifying information. But because they were not acknowledged
to be witnesses, it is not clear why publishing that information was so damaging to the
Tribunal. How did the Al Akhbar articles undermine public confidence in the Tribunal in
ways that other articles criticizing the Tribunal for failing to preserve its confidentiality
would not? For example, would the charge of contempt be appropriate if the articles had
not released the “false” names but had still persuasively shown that confidential information
about the Tribunal is easily obtainable?
21 Akhbar Beirut Decision on Jurisdiction, supra note 17, para. 71.
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Part of the answer might be that a nonfabricated publication would be excused because it
would have more social value and be protected by the journalist’s freedom of expression.
Recall that Judge Lettieri characterized the Al Akhbar articles as politically motivated and
poorly substantiated. However, this answer is incomplete. Judge Lettieri’s judgment ulti-
mately rests on a determination that the Al Akhbar articles were intended to, and probably
did, undermine public confidence in the Tribunal. If that is the standard, then the freedom to
be critical of the Tribunal would still have to be balanced against the cost to the Tribunal and
might, in the end, lose out. Because the judgment does not include a discernable limiting
principle for protecting the freedom of expression in cases of contempt, it has the potential
to be quite expansive.
MONICA HAKIMI
University of Michigan Law School
doi:10.1017/ajil.2017.1
INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS2017 139
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2017.1
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 28 Sep 2017 at 18:21:19, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
